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ABSTRACT. Transport cost is second in importance after production cost in 
industry. It is the purpose of the present paper to study the impact of 
information sharing and contractual instruments between a supply chain and its 
transport suppliers. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to 
measure the benefits in terms of transport cost and standard deviation of 
transport cost. We evaluate three scenarios over one period reiterated for a 
shipper carrier two-echelon model with a mix of long-term and short-term 
procurement strategies: perfect information, asymmetric information and 
private information at one level of the supply chain. We evaluate the transfer 
in rent between carrier and shipper according to the information known and 
give some insights on optimal contract parameters.  1 
Keywords: 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The transport sector is a key service provider of all industrial supply chains. Transport intervenes at 
all nodes of the industrial supply chain: from the primary raw material to the final delivery of the 
finished product at the end-customer’s premises. Transport cost is the second in importance after 
the production cost in industry. In the USA transport costs represent almost 6% of GDP (8.6% in 
the EU) of which road freight represents around 75%. If one remembers that the service sector now 
represents about 60% of the GDP in the USA, transport looms even more as a component of the 
costs of the industrial sector. From the supply chain management vantage point, the impact of its 
costs and distinguishing properties on the overall performance of the supply chain merit to be 
looked at in a unifying and distinctive way. As opposed to other suppliers, all forms of transport are 
homogeneous in their characteristics: pure service, non-stockable products to meet demand and no 
production facilities (consumption-value only good as in Routledge 2000). However, transport 
services require highly specific long-life assets and its fixed costs represent an important share of 
total costs. Transport is principally a capacity-constrained, fixed-cost service industry. 
Because of its highly specific nature and ability to share costs and investments among several 
clients, transport is overwhelmingly provided by third parties, independent from users of transport. 
The terminology in use distinguishes between the “shipper”, the client, from the “carrier”, provider 
of transport services. In this paper, we further distinguish carriers by the contractual nature of the 
relationships that link them to shippers: we distinguish the “usual” carriers from the “sporadic”, 
governed by different contractual obligations, prices and time horizons. In this paper, the transport 
industry is considered in its broadest range but excluding transport of persons: from belt conveyors 
to express deliveries, trucks, planes, electric power lines, pipelines and so on. 
Usually a shipper draws up long term contracts with several carriers for periodical quantity 
stationary commitments, limited flexibility (the shipper can exceed contracted capacity per period 
by paying progressively higher prices), rolling horizon flexibility (Anupindi 1998) as to volume, 
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frequencies, prices, quality of service and eventual penalty or compensatory clauses. To the shipper, 
these carriers represent the core of her pool of transport service providers. 
Each carrier also links himself to several shippers at the same time by contractual ties for the core of 
his capacity. Besides selling his capacity to shippers on contract, the carrier uses the spot market to 
sell his excess capacity on a “per job” basis. The contractual characteristics are: short term, short 
lead times, no pre-contractual price specifications, no obligation to deliver on the part of the carrier. 
To the shipper, these represent the next tier of transport service providers; their services have been 
used in the past and have been rated. They are necessary for special tasks or for meeting peaks in 
demand. The prices of such transactions are pegged to a “spot” market where available capacity 
meets an uncertain demand. A word is necessary here about the spot market. Unlike other markets 
for commodities, transport spot market is composed in fact of two markets: one for the one-leg trips 
where the shipper pays for just one side of the trip (this, of course, is valid only for transport using 
mobile units, not pipelines or electric lines), and the other, where the shipper facing the possibility 
that his cargo might not be shipped in time, accepts to pay both sides, including empty backhaul. 
This spot market is characterized by different lead times: if the shipper wants to pay just one way, 
he will have to wait for the carrier to find some cargo to bring back on the backhaul. If the shipment 
cannot wait, then the price is the full two way price. 
Backed by easy financing, E-marketplaces in transport launched in 2000 made the mistake, borne 
from insufficient knowledge, that enormous transport capacity could be made available online to 
shippers on a “spot” basis and that transactions would ensue. Grieger (2003) shows, building on 
Wise and Morrison (2000), that suppliers do not want to be anonymous contestants in a ruthless 
bidding war, they prefer to belong to a hierarchical co-ordination of the supply chain, involved in 
hierarchical transactions. In this line of thought: “co-operative supply chains aim to reduce the 
number of suppliers and form long-term strategic alliances that ‘lock in’ suppliers and ‘lock out’ 
competition” (Grieger, 2003). The transport industry falls neatly into this category, proportionately 
little cargo can be moved by taking advantage of excess capacity (usually the backhaul leg of a 
truck’s trip coming back empty) because the shipper has to respect strict delivery times and cannot 
just wait for the possibility of a truck becoming available for just that trip, that day and that cargo. 
Our purpose here is not to try and solve all the problems faced in a carrier – shipper relationship but 
rather to bring to light some particularities and bring attention to some mechanisms and behaviours 
that alter supply chain efficiency.  
This paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in the second section, the third 
section describes a model involving one single tier in the supply chain: the contractual relationship 
between one shipper as client and one carrier as transport supplier. The interest of studying this 
particular type of node in the supply chain is that all along a chain where real products are delivered 
(i.e. not services) transport is necessary at each step, from raw material producer to end-customer 
distribution. In this third section, we describe and characterize the nature and specificities of the 
contract linking the carrier to the shipper. In the fourth section, we describe three scenarios of 
behaviour for them: in the first, base scenario, the information is common to both, decisions are 
centrally coordinated. In the second scenario, we consider that the carrier retains a certain measure 
of information from the shipper. In the third, both shipper and carrier hide information from each 
other. In the fifth section, the numerical study, we generate a sample of instances of demands and 
transport spot prices and run each scenario on that sample. We sum the cost of operation and 
efficient fill rate for shipper and carrier. In the light of the comparison of the results we draw 
conclusions as to the importance and impact of both information and contractual arrangements 





2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Supply chain performance depends critically on how its members coordinate their decisions. And it 
is hard to imagine coordination without some form of information sharing, as Fangruo Chen 
remarked in Chen (2002). In the supply chain management literature, transport service providers as 
suppliers are not usually individualized as such. In one line of literature, the transport industry is 
seen as a cost-centre in its own right. This approach leads research on efficient planning of routes, 
networks, warehouse location etc. Hosts of software packages have been developed to address the   XAVIER BRUSSET  3 
 
 
necessary calculations to optimize on a daily or on a strategical basis the deliveries and transport of 
cargo. In the other line of literature, the transport industry is bundled with the other suppliers to the 
supply chain and, as such, its efficiency can be increased by coordination, truth-inducing 
mechanisms, contractual engineering and information sharing (see Chen’s review of 2002 and 1998, 
2001a, 2001b, Chen & Yu 2001a, Chen – Yu 2001b, Anupindi 1998, Porteus and Whang 1991, Lee 
and Whang 1999, Cachon et al. 1999, Zhao 2002). However, since their supplier definition entails 
back-logging of orders and inventory management, not all results apply to carriers or shippers. 
Ertogral et al. (1998) bridges both lines of thought: a single model integrates production and 
transportation planning, taking into account transport costs and schedules. This approach does not 
take into account the impact of imperfect information and decentralized decisions. Neither does it 
take into consideration the eventual over or under utilization of the transport capacity involved. The 
integer program setup optimizes transport costs, routing, scheduling by integrating distances, 
transport time, time-windows and full or partial truck loads costs to the production planning.  
The transport industry characterises itself by the non-scalable capital intensive production 
investments needed and a high share of fixed costs within total costs. Capacity can be expanded 
only well in advance of output requirement. Full capacity utilization is thus one of the primary 
objectives. Supply chain management dedicates commendable space to capacity as a limiting factor; 
authors have modelled that constraint in several papers. Gilbert and Cvsa (2000) model the 
behaviour of the client who under-invests in cost-reduction so as to escape being held up by the 
supplier. That model looked at the trade-off faced by a firm when its downstream channel partner 
has opportunities to invest in making relationship specific marginal cost reductions. The case of 7-
Eleven and Frito Lay serves as illustration. Should 7-Eleven invest in reducing its variable costs in 
distributing certain Frito Lay products and see Frito Lay profit by it? The authors propose to 
construct a wholesale pricing contract that Frito Lay will extend to 7-Eleven to encourage 
investment in variable cost reduction in the presence of market uncertainty. By crafting this ex-ante 
pricing contract, the retailer’s interests are aligned with the manufacturer’s and eliminates or at least 
reduces supplier opportunistic behaviour. 
A paper that has modelled contracting arrangements for capital-intensive, capacity-constrained 
goods is Wu et al (2002). In it, the authors have specifically targeted the energy sector but have 
tried to enlarge the results to other capacity-constrained sectors like hotels, airlines, plastics, 
chemicals and other dated/perishable capital-intensive service providers like transport. They have 
put in the limelight the “two-goods problem”, the first of which is the availability of capacity itself, 
pre-committed to a specific buyer, and the second is the output actually delivered on the day to the 
buyer. This gives rise to the existence of two different markets where prices are formed: spot 
pricing where “on-the-day” demand meets offer and pre-arranged bilateral contracting. The paper 
provides valuable insights on the optimal balance between selling capacity in the forward contract 
market versus selling on the spot market. This paper provides an answer to industries where 
conditions of storability are not given. Their results give a structure where a buyer and a seller can 
derive guidance on the optimal strategy between optimal forward contracting and spot buying of 
capacity. This model applies aptly to energy and other bulk products that have standard quality, 
interchangeable buyers and sellers and that rely on relatively efficient spot markets. This is not 
exactly the case of transport: parties to a contract have to iron out several operational details as to 
execution, quality criteria, etc that make each contract unique and entails greater transaction costs.   
Spinler & Huchzermeier (2003) propose a variation of the preceding model by using options in lieu 
of futures contracts and spot market to increase capacity utilisation in the presence of state-
contingent demand. The purpose is to effectively offset part of the risk posed by fluctuating demand 
by a strategy which combines buying options on capacity ahead of revelation of demand and 
complementing by spot transactions upon the period of requiring that capacity. They show that such 
a strategy effectively is Pareto improving for both the seller of the option (transport supplier) and 
the buyer (the shipper). Both reduce their risk and the volatility of their costs. To circumvent the 
liquidity problem of transport as a non-standardized service, the model assumes that options will be 
traded on electronic marketplaces where information and transaction costs are lesser. As Grieger 
(2003) reported (Cf supra), carriers and shippers may be wary to trade with partners of unknown 
quality and customer-satisfaction drive, jeopardizing the forecast efficiency and welfare. This issue 
does not arise for electricity, the other industry specifically addressed in Spinler & Huchzermeier, 
because of the more standardized nature of the traded good. 
Agrell et al (2002) model a 3-stage, 2-period supply chain in the telecom sector. A supplier can 
decide to invest into certain new capacity and may share the economies by lowering his price. This 
model specifically excludes long-term partnerships that encourage parties to engage in activities   XAVIER BRUSSET  4 
 
 
that are unfavourable in the short term but have substantial payoffs over time. The game between 
the shipper and carrier typically has to carry on for a long period (typically 2 to 5 years, coherent 
with the life-span of the specific asset) which practically eliminates the hit-and-run tactics that the 
authors might observe in their model due to asymmetric information. 
We draw on the quantity flexibility contract clause mechanism under retailer uncertain demand 
(Tsay et al. 1999a, Tsay 1999, Tsay & Lovejoy 1999, Anupindi 1998, Tsay 2000, Cachon 2002), 
designed to align the behaviour of the supplier. “The Quantity Flexibility clause defines terms under 
which the quantity a buyer ultimately obtains may deviate from a previous planning estimate. The 
conditions can include limits on the range of allowable changes, pricing rules, or both.” (Tsay et al 
1999a). As in our setting, capacity has to be planned well in advance, the carrier has a strong 
incentive to encourage the buyer to forecast and plan honestly the cargo to be effectively 
transported. We should therefore model the incentive that the carrier has to include in the contract 
for that coordination to take place. One of the simplest mechanisms is for the shipper to pay the 
carrier a penalty when realized demand comes in at a level inferior to contracted capacity. This 
mechanism has been studied in Cachon & Lariviere (1997): the manufacturer pays a cancellation 
fee per unit not purchased if he takes delivery of fewer than the agreed-upon number of units. 
Another would be for the carrier to extract from the shipper a commitment for a given capacity, 
whatever the realized demand. A third is for the carrier and shipper to agree to a given cumulative 
capacity Kn over a number N of periods: if in one period the realized demand is less than predicted, 
the shipper is committed to make it up to the carrier in future periods (as in Bassok & Anupindi 
1997).  
Similarly, the shipper must obtain the maximum capacity at the least price given demand risk. In 
other words, he must angle for risk sharing with the carrier. Just settling for a given capacity at a set 
price is not enough for him to achieve low transport cost variance over a long time horizon. Thus 
some measure of flexibility in capacity has to be introduced. Several mechanisms can be 
implemented. One of these would be to set up a menu of extra capacities at pre-arranged prices: if 
the demand effectively exceeds the base contractual capacity, the shipper calls up extra capacity to 
meet it using this clause to set the premium price. Another would be to set a penalty clause for the 
carrier when he is unable to meet the capacity thus committed: whenever the carrier fails to meet 
the shipper’s demand, he pays a penalty proportionate to the shortcoming. In Moinzadeh & 
Nahmias 1997 that same general problem is treated: Q, the minimum commitment per period is 
given and there are both fixed and proportional penalties for adjustments, over an infinite horizon.  
The authors contend, but do not formally prove, that a type of order-up-to policy (s,S) is optimal. In 
that model, the fixed delivery contract with penalties serves as a risk sharing mechanism. 
Because the demand, when realized, directly results in a transport requirement, there can be no 
time-flexibility arrangements as those described in the literature (Li & Kouvelis 1997, Barnes & 
Schuster 1997). 
It has to be mentioned that, in our approach, we have elected to consider that transport capacities 
are not freely substitutable, ruling out “overbooking” (Karaesmen et al., 2002). In other words, a 
carrier cannot just overbook his fleet on a given time slot because cargo available for that time slot 
cannot just be moved to the next available time slot and there are few cases of “no-shows”. 
Our market mechanism draws also on the model in Seifert et al. (2003) for simultaneous long-term 
and short-term (spot) buying of commodities by a client from one or various suppliers. They study 
the impact of different buying strategies, involving different spot vs. contract buying proportions 
under various conditions of volatility of the spot price and also according to whether or not the 
client can eventually resell the commodity. They show that buying a “moderate” fraction of total 
needs on the spot market significantly improves profits over the contract-only behaviour. Their 
model contemplates both the possibility to buy and sell the commodity on the part of the buyer and 
also the “buy only” situation which is our case (it is not economically feasible for the shipper to 
resell unwanted transport capacity). We follow along the same path in modelling the behaviour of 
the shipper: he can simultaneously buy through long term contracts and through spot transactions 
the needed transport capacity to face the realized demand addressed to him, giving him added 
flexibility. Whereas previous research applies to commodities and thus takes into account stocks 
and inventory, we extend the results to the case of transport services after due modifications. 
Our general model follows a similar pattern to that adopted in Gavirneni et al. (1999). That study 
set up three scenarios that differ by the information level of the participants. In this case, the 
information is the distribution of the sales addressed to the retailer and whether or not the supplier 
can be aware of the law of that demand, and whether he can further benefit by receiving   XAVIER BRUSSET  5 
 
 
immediately sales data from the retailer. To study the impact of information on capacity and 
inventory, each scenario evaluates the level of information affecting the optimum capacity and 
inventory at the supplier level. Penalties for the supplier are included when demand addressed to 
him goes unsatisfied. Similarly to Gavirneni (1999), the simulations in this work do consider 
different demand distributions and different standard deviations of demand faced by the shipper. 
However, the carrier cannot evaluate nor study sales data distribution laws because we suppose that 
the realized demand addressed to the shipper can be immediately satisfied by the carrier with no 
lead time and no inventory. The results of this paper and those of Gavinerni (1999) could be joined 
however in a further research into the advantages that could eventually be gained if the carrier could 
share with the shipper the inventory/sales data at the demand level. Take the case for example of the 
shampoo manufacturer having to deliver products to supermarkets; the carrier could benefit by 
knowing in advance the supermarket’s ordering policy, inventory or sales. 
In this paper, we show the importance and effects that both information sharing and coordination 
can have on the profitability of the carriers and the shippers. We have chosen to stick as closely to 
actual industrial practice so as to enable readers in transport procurement to easily apply the 
conclusions and calibrate better their bargaining with transport and logistic companies. The relative 
importance of information is clearly marked out so as to give information sharing and trust building 
the share they should have in a well thought out strategy.  Given the variety of information which 
must be shared in a normal shipper-carrier relationship, the opportunities to enhance efficiency in 
the supply chain abound. This area is probably the one where the most progress will be made in the 
years to come bringing to the firms who will master it valuable nuggets of efficiency as well as 
increased responsiveness.  
 
 
3.  TRANSPORT MARKET MODEL 
Transport, as an industry, is at once very standardized in its service and very diverse in its physical 
infrastructure and this makes for difficult modelling. Standard features, at least across industrial 
sectors, are the basic measures of transport as a service as outlined by Morash (2001): fill rate, 
stockouts, cycle time, complete orders, on-time deliveries, backorders. Due to the geographic 
infrastructure in place, some physical aspects do have some very common traits: road, rail and 
water transport, among others, are divided among small units that often share common warehouse 
and handling infrastructures even though transported products can be very diverse. The interface 
between shipper and carrier is also very standardized across product types (same procurement 
procedures, same billing and payment norms, common cost structures, international terms of trade, 
common legal and regulatory framework). Our model tries to build upon the most general features 
and not depend upon special ones so as to enable possible empirical validation in the most various 
settings. 
We assume that a shipper SL require some specific transport infrastructure. She contends with 
uncertainty on two fronts: the first is a stochastic demand. The second is a market for transport 
services where spot prices can vary, substantially affecting her costs (fig. 2). 
Because of uncertainty on these two fronts, the shipper SL chooses to minimize at least one source 
of uncertainty by tendering for a long term contract among several carriers he has been able to 
select by some order qualifying test. This feature is standard practice among all major industrial or 
otherwise B2B shippers. The ensuing contract is signed for a long period, proportionate to the life-
span of the assets that both the carrier and the shipper will have to invest in to fill in their respective 
engagements. So SL buys transport services through an ex-ante long term contract. To complement 
this contract, SL also has the ability to buy extra capacity from the rest of the market for a spot 
transport price (equivalent to short term contracts, Seifert 2003). The motivation for SL to buy on 
the spot market may be in fact that her necessities may vary in such a degree as to render ex-ante 
contracting of large capacities uneconomical.  
Let C be the carrier who has signed the contract with SL and who further serves the market for 
unused capacity at the going spot price. Every period, C first serves the demand from SL than from 
the market. However, capacity is not binding for the shipper: whenever she cannot purchase the 
necessary capacity from C, she turns to the spot market for the remainder (see fig 4). Our interest is 
not in the allocation game. The shipper’s objective function is a composite function of minimization 
of cost and maximization of client satisfaction. 
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3.1.  Motivation of shipper and carrier behaviour 
This model is set in the transaction cost economics (TCE) stream of economic literature. Therefore, 
the contract is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains. Under 
this view, the contract cannot be more than an attempt at incompletely predicting future outcomes 
and present each partner with a set of pre-arranged guides to the other’s behaviour. Building upon 
both past experience transport practice in industry and TCE theory, we include in the model the 
possibility that one or both parties will behave opportunistically during the lifetime of the contract. 
This can happen especially since both carrier and shipper have to invest in specific assets to be able 
to comply with the contract requirements: specific transport vehicles, specific quality-enhancing 
procedures, personnel training, warehouses, software, logistical equipment, etc. These assets have 
low redeployable value and effectively contribute to strong inter-dependency and allow post-
contractual opportunism. We have neglected to consider the asymmetry in dependency which 
comes from one party being “stronger” or having more bargaining power than the other (e.g. due to 
higher competitive pressure on the carrier, specific asset investment asymmetry, or shipper image 
integrity hostage to carrier among others). This is on the specific purpose of enabling further 
empirical study to apply to both cases where the shipper is the stronger and hence more likely to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour as to cases where the opposite is true. 
Both theory and practice share the observation that “[p]arties to a transaction that are bilaterally 
dependent are “vulnerable”, in that buyers cannot easily turn to alternative sources of supply, while 
suppliers can redeploy specialized assets to their next best use or user only at a loss of productive 
value” (Williamson 2002, p.176). 
In view of the preceding comments, how can each party still engage in opportunistic behaviour?  
First it has to be noted that both shipper and carrier are risk averse: the shipper wishes to avert the 
transport price volatility inherent in the spot market, the carrier wishes to ensure steady and 
sufficient revenues to match his financial and commercial costs over the long term. Both have as 
objective to reduce volatility when negotiating the ex-ante contract and reduce transport cost / 
increase revenue on a per period basis during the life of the contract.   
As both practice and theory reveal, a common behaviour is to retain information from the other that 
could enable the other party to claim compensation or assume a retaliatory attitude. The range of 
information liable to this kind of claim is vast: early or timely information of future transport needs, 
subsequent changes in schedules, delays in delivery, type or quality of transport capacity available, 
prices etc. It would have been best to include the largest possible array of information gauges in our 
model, but effects of some kind of information on costs or profits are distinctly difficult to quantify. 
We have chosen for simplicity’s sake to restrict our demonstration to just two forms of information 
amenable to modelling: information about the available capacity that the carrier can offer to the 
shipper and information on the exact demand addressed to the shipper. If information about 
available capacity is kept from the shipper she may not know that the carrier is in fact redeploying it 
for better profit elsewhere. On the other hand, if the carrier is not cognizant of the exact demand 
addressed to the shipper, he may not be able to observe that capacity has been bought from some 
competitor at a lower price. 
At issue are not only the ex-ante bargaining and crafting of the contractual arrangements but also 
the ongoing contractual relations. We will study both under different scenarios: under the most 
favourable one, trust is comforted by observability of information. The shipper SL observes the 
exact available capacity at each period of carrier C and C observes the realized demand addressed to 
SL. This is our base scenario, consistent with the literature’s definition of central control in the 
power of a single decision-maker with access to all available information as could be the case if 
both entities were part of the same corporation. In the second scenario, SL cannot observe the 
capacity of C, but C does observe SL’s realized demand (or SL makes that information available to 
C). In our third scenario, SL cannot observe C’s capacity and C cannot observe SL’s realized 
demand. In effect, we assume that there is no common knowledge of payoffs, or at least that this 
knowledge comes at a price. We do not model or attempt to include in our model the cost of such 
information gathering.  
We assume in this paper that both parties will be better off (and will recognize that such an attitude 
has long term pay-offs) if they commit to informing truthfully. We venture that given today’s 
competitive pressures put on all industrial manufacturers, given the emphasis put on dependability, 
given the high density of the meshing binding supplier and client, neither a carrier nor a shipper will 
risk antagonizing the other by consciously retaining information. In today’s markets, because of the 
sunk investments and specific assets involved, such an attitude entails risks of client loss, reputation   XAVIER BRUSSET  7 
 
 
loss and other unquantifiable damage. We further venture to suggest that the contractual hazards 
increase inversely to technological development of the transport market (a testable empirical 
hypothesis would then be that less developed countries have higher relative transaction costs). 
The model also takes into account diverse contractual arrangements because of their influence on 
the behaviour of both parties. No optimal contract design approach has been chosen. We have 
chosen some that are considered of importance by their impact on the behaviour of contracting 
parties. Behaviour is guided by profit in both the short and the long term so we concentrate on the 
three repetitive and constant attitudes described earlier during the lifetime of the contract. We 
further consider that if one party behaves opportunistically, he will never be caught, so that the 
renewal of the contract should be independent of the behaviour. However, it is obvious that both 
parties will draw conclusions as to the past benefits and effective service rates (both observable) 
during the life of the expired contract when renegotiating terms. 
By the construction of our model, the gains of one party are the losses of the other, meaning that 
globally, social welfare does not increase except perhaps by lowered transaction costs in the 
following contract (if there is one). 
 
3.2.  Contract characteristics 
The importance of contracts in co-ordinating a supply chain and improving system efficiencies have 
been highlighted in a number of papers: Seifert (2003), Gilbert et al (2000), Van Mieghem (2001), 
Tsay et al (1999a). We have used a contract as a coordination mechanism because of its popularity 
in the transport industry and because it is recognized that the information structure in the transport 
industry shows wide asymmetry and conflicting objectives between carrier and shipper. 
The contract results in most cases from a tender offer set up by the shipper and where a limited 
number of carriers are invited to bid. This first set is selected because of their experience and/or 
ability in transporting goods for other shippers in the same industrial sector (or an adjacent one). In 
the first round, the shipper qualifies on technical grounds a group of carriers. Among the qualifying 
criteria used by the shipper, one of the most common is the capacity that the carrier will be able to 
allocate to the shipper in the course of the contract. In a second round, these qualified carriers will 
receive an invitation to bid according to a schedule of conditions or terms of reference. The shipper 
selects the best bid and signs a contract where a number of conditions about quality, quantity, 
penalties and duration of the contract are fixed. The unselected carriers that have qualified for the 
second round can, however, still hope to share in part of the shipper’s business: they become the 
second tier carriers and will receive orders pegged to the spot market price in instances when the 
winning carrier cannot take all the cargo the shipper has to ship. 
We must now engage in setting the aspects of the optimal contract given the current theoretical 
setup. We have chosen the taxonomy of contracts in Tsay et al (1999). According to this taxonomy, 
contracts are classified by contract clauses and we now discuss each one in turn. 
3.2.1.  Long versus short term 
To shadow more closely practical thought in transport industry, we have considered that any 
contract will extend over a large, finite number of sub-periods. This means that each party can and 
will take into consideration both the long and short term. So, they will behave so as to maximise 
profits in the short term (one sub-period) and also retain some possibility of achieving profits over 
the long term (length of the contract is one period and the possibility of being an insider when 
competition starts to renegotiate a contract upon renewal for the next period). Issues concerning 
appraisal and calculation of reputation effects, trust and other intangible benefits of a self binding 
behaviour have not been settled satisfactorily in the literature on contracts. We have chosen not to 
include in our model calculations of the impact over the long term of such behaviours, but just 
assume some degree of reputation preserving behaviour. As observed in Tsay et al (1999): “the 
lengthening of the time horizon may encourage parties to engage in activities that are unfavourable 
in the short term but have substantial payoffs over time.” In effect, “stable partnerships can reduce 
transaction costs and allow for greater cooperation (e.g. information sharing and collaborative 
product and process improvement)”. The present model is more of a single period (the contract), 
finite horizon structure. 
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In our setting, the decisions in each period are few: SL can choose to solicit C for additional 
capacity under the terms of the menu of prices, as described later. The base transport price is set and 
SL has no control over the demand that is being addressed to him.  C has the obligation to comply 
with the capacity requirements and quality levels in accordance with contract specifications. The 
advantage of such restriction of decision rights is to enhance stability and visibility in costs and 
reduce on-going negotiations during the contract’s life. Both parties are better off if they can plan 
far ahead with no haggling. Any extra capacity or cargo is off loaded onto the spot market or can be 
freely traded between shipper and carrier using the spot market price as reference. 
3.2.3.  Pricing 
Pricing plays a role for both parties. To the carrier, it enables him to match his long term capacity 
and quality-enhancing investments plans with his workload and revenue projections. To the shipper, 
it sets a reference to guide his budgetary planning process over various periods. Both have an 
interest in fixing for the longest possible period the price of the service to be delivered. We have 
chosen to set a price per unit of cargo up to a fixed capacity over the life of the contract and for one 
leg of each trip (this simplification allows to include in our scope all types of transport including 
pipelines, power lines and such). The carrier is committed to taking the cargo the shipper has at 
each period for that price per unit (this implies both that the carrier already has the same frequency 
return cargo for long-haul freight and that this price covers the carrier’s variable cost). The terms of 
the contract will specify the capacity that the carrier has to reserve for her use. This capacity is the 
object of ex-ante verification by the shipper. Refusing to honour this basic capacity requirement is a 
motive to reopen the contract and eventually to terminate it. Some contracts specify a price for a 
given capacity whatever the real cargo effectively transported up to that capacity. This is called 
capacity reservation and applies to very specific activities where the cost of unused capacity bears 
no comparison to the cost of long lead time or inability to deliver the service to the shipper (case of 
a standby plane or helicopter for medical urgencies). Using a price per quantity transported also 
makes it a variable cost to the shipper. 
The case of the two-part tariff, so dear to most authors in supply chain literature, would be awkward 
in this setting for the shipper because he would not be able to make the cost totally variable. 
Further, it would displace some of the risk of demand variance onto him, instead of shifting it to the 
carrier. We argue that the shipper enjoys sufficient power over the carrier (and eventual 
competitors) to force the carrier to accept a totally variable cost. There is, however, a compensation 
to the carrier which we cover later in the form of a penalty for overestimating the realised demand 
that the shipper pays to the carrier. 
Periodic reviews as well as other forms of indexation of this base price are covered in our model, 
because such automatic price changes are not subject to haggling and are fixed and known within 
each period, not affecting either party.  
3.2.4.  Minimum purchase commitments 
The minimum purchase commitment clause included in most contracts takes the form here of a 
target of cargo to be transported at each period. It is for this capacity that the shipper pays a set unit 
price, basic object of the contract. The capacity corresponds to the average demand that the shipper 
hopes to receive over the life of the contract. It can be seasonal or take any other form of evolution, 
according to the shipper’s forecast. The shipper would be tempted to overestimate the real capacity 
needed if that might help him garner a lower price from the carrier. To encourage credible 
information as to expected demand from the shipper (who is privately informed of his demand 
when negotiating the contract), we have taken into account the results from Cachon & Lariviere 
(1997) and Cachon & Zipkin (1999), where penalties are imposed to achieve Nash equilibria. The 
adjustment mechanism we have chosen for its simplicity and because it relies on observable 
information on each part is a penalty imposed on the shipper for the unused contracted capacity in 
each period. With such a penalty in place, the carrier can hope to obtain the necessary information 
as to the average demand expected by the shipper.  
This penalty alone will not suffice in guaranteeing his necessary capacity investments that are 
required to meet the capacity commitments. Only part of the risk arising from demand variance is 
mitigated. The level of such a penalty, relative to the base price per unit is the subject of negotiation 
between the shipper and carrier and reflects their power leverage. 
We are conscious that this is a somewhat artificial coordinating mechanism so we have included in 
the numerical study the case where the penalties are set to zero. 
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The quantity flexibility (QF) described in the taxonomy of Tsay et al (1999) describes the benefit 
the buyer receives under such a clause as being the advantage of deviate from previously planned 
estimate thus allowing for a degree of liberty where previously there was none. They describe the 
clause as a way for the buyer to forecast and plan more deliberately and honestly. The seller gives 
the buyer a price break to give the buyer an incentive to participate. To Tsay et al, the “QF clause 
has risk-sharing intent, and the hope is that the agreement can make both parties better off”. Tsay 
(1999) models the behaviour of a client and supplier who would each have an incentive to overstate 
intended purchases and underestimate necessary capacity but whose conduct is effectively 
coordinated by penalties imposed both ways: on over-forecasting and on under-producing, leading 
to a system-wide optimal outcome. Following along the same tracks, to allow for some flexibility in 
the demand that the shipper receives, we have included a menu of prices that give some additional 
capacities that the shipper can call upon under certain conditions of price. This menu of prices 
encourages the shipper to call upon the carrier for the unforeseen demand received
2. This added 
flexibility is of increasing value to the buyer as market environment becomes more volatile, 
according to the description in Tsay et al (1999) of Tsay & Lovejoy (1998).  
3.2.6.  Buyback or return policies 
This type of clause does not apply in our context: transport is not a stockable product. 
3.2.7.  Allocation rules 
We have modelled a priority rule whereby the carrier first serves shipper SL. We presume that the 
existence of a long term contract and penalties generate sufficient incentives for this behaviour. 
Reciprocally, the shipper SL also first allocates his realized demand to C before turning to the spot 
market. His interest is not only to financially help his supplier, but also to reduce the slightly higher 
transaction costs that any transaction on the spot market has versus using the contractual supplier. 
No contractual clause to foster this behaviour has been allowed for in our model. The order in 
which the decisions take place are the following (see also fig 1 and fig. 2): 
o  S observes carrier capacity W, contract signed. 
o  SL first observes demand QL addressed to her and spot market transport price Ps. 
o  SL decides on the allocation of a share u of demand QL to C. 
o  C observes the spot market price and allocates capacity xL to her and xs to the spot 
market. 
o  After observing the allocation of capacity by C to her, SL allocates the remaining 
demand QL to the spot market. 
o  Transport is performed. 
o  Payout occurs. 
There could be an interesting study to be done however in the case where a large number of clients 
face the same highly seasonal demand and the transporting providers’ capacity is a bottleneck. 
                                                 
2 The price is higher than the base capacity price because the marginal cost to the carrier of such capacity is higher than the average and 
constrains his overall capacity and ability to meet other commitments. Remember that the capacity is non-scalable unless notified well in 




Fig. 1: Chain of events: decisions by players in grey 
 
3.2.8.  Lead time and quality 
In our model lead time is not an issue since revelation of demand to shipper SL is immediately 
followed by his order of capacity to C. In the same “simultaneous” moment, C knows how much of 
his capacity is left and he can serve the market own demand at spot market price. This is of course a 
simplification of reality: orders for capacity from SL to C may arrive at 15h00 of one day for service 
on the next and SL may require by 17h00 an answer for his request for capacity. By 18h00, all 
available spot capacity in the market must be allotted. Any slip-up in this tight schedule may cause 
costly delays and juggling of orders. Advance knowledge of capacity demand becomes a highly 
desirable/valued feature to a carrier. This lead time scheduling and capacity allotment, distinct from 
yield management already the subject of numerous studies, should be investigated further. 
As to quality, we have considered in our model, perhaps too simply, that carrier C has been elected 
among a set of carriers comparable in quality levels and qualified on all required quality yardsticks 
that SL may impose. 
3.2.9.  Notation 
C and SL have negotiated ex-ante and are bound by a contract extending over one period of n sub 
periods with known and fixed parameters. SL agrees to buy at each sub-period capacity qL at price c. 
The shipper has to pay a penalty θs for unused capacity up to qL at each period. The carrier suffers a 
penalty θc if he cannot  (or chooses no to) carry the contracted capacity qL at each period for non-
performance of contracted service. The contract includes a menu of prices pLa at quantities qLa that 
the carrier offers to the shipper SL to help him meet demand in excess of the contracted capacity 
commitment qL up till qLa (fig.2). The menu is a list of prices linear with the capacity offered. This 
seems counter intuitive: one would expect that the higher the capacity sought by the shipper, the 
lesser the marginal cost to the carrier, so that the carrier would be motivated to make a volume 
discount to capture the excess demand. We will revisit this matter when discussing the coordinating 
power of the contract. Each price in the menu is the going price for all the excess capacity required 
by the shipper. This menu is a list of options that the carrier presents on a “take it or leave it” basis 
to the shipper for the length of the contract and which the shipper can exercise at each period. The 
shipper will ask for more capacity if the demand addressed to him exceeds the committed capacity 
qL, thus giving him added leeway to meet unforeseen demands that could not be predicted when 
drawing up contract specifications.  This is not an option in the true sense since there is no premium 
to be paid but rather an option on a forward contract as the shipper is committed to taking the 
available capacity offered under the terms of the menu (quantity and price); even if the spot price is 
less than the price in the menu for that given additional capacity. 
 
3.3.  Opportunistic behaviour 
Opportunistic behaviour occurs in our case when either the shipper SL or the carrier can escape from 
their contractual engagements without incurring retaliation from the other party. Retaliation can 
happen in one of two ways: either the party victim of the moral hazard has the possibility to obtain 
compensation through some previously agreed upon compensation or he does not and his recourse 
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renew the contract when it comes up for renewal. In any case, if truthfulness is a priori reigning in 
the relationship, all retaliation depends upon verifying opportunistic behaviour. The party wishing 
that verification incurs a cost to perform this information collecting process. This cost can be large 
in the case of two arms-length entities like the ones in our case. We will focus in this paper on 
certain pieces of information which can be hard to come by and which can make a significant 
impact on the cost functions of either party. There are a number of other items of information which 
can be verifiable only at a cost and that can result from moral hazard (precise delivery date and time 
for example). 
The first piece of information belongs to the carrier and is the size of the transport capacity he 
owns or otherwise controls. Ex-ante the shipper does verify the available capacity of the carrier and 
the carrier must convey all necessary information so that the shipper can be assured that the 
required capacity exists. This is included in the due-diligence that the shipper does to qualify the 
carrier for the second round of the tender. Thereafter, no further control is undertaken by the shipper 
in the course of the contract. So, in the course of the life of the contract, this information is no 
longer observable and the shipper would incur a cost in verifying it. In some circumstances, the 
capacity under the carrier’s control can extend to sub-contractors which are not linked to the carrier 
in a formal way but by affinity or other commercial links (this is the case of owner-operated trucks 
that can take spot engagements for other larger carriers on an ad hoc basis). The shipper cannot 
easily verify that the carrier has more than the basic contracted capacity to ensure correct execution 
of his contracted commitments. It is not even verifiable ex-post without the explicit cooperation of 
the carrier. Only when the contract comes up for renewal can the shipper use records of past 
shipments to assess the capacity of the carrier. In a way, this is the only possible recourse the 
shipper has: not to renew the contract with this carrier. 
The second piece of information involves the size of the available transport requirements of the 
shipper: the carrier may not be able to verify period after period that the orders handed him by the 
shipper represent his entire necessity. This information is also neither observable directly nor 
verifiable without cost to the carrier. The shipper may contract added capacity with other carriers 
whenever its suits him financially. 
Depending upon the spot price in the market and since the carrier’s total capacity is non-verifiable 
and non-observable by the shipper, the carrier can engage in hidden action by refusing to comply 
with the demand from the shipper, pay the corresponding penalty θc and sell this excess capacity in 
the spot market. In this case, the shipper has no other recourse than to offer his cargo on the spot 
market. We have not modelled the loss of lead time that ensues, but it clearly has an impact to the 
shipper that could be evaluated and included in a future study. 
The shipper SL can also deviate when her realized demand is not observable by the carrier. When 
the spot price is lower than the menu of prices less the penalty, the shipper can deviate from 
standard contractual behaviour by refusing to purchase capacity in excess of qL from the carrier and 
instead buy the necessary complement from the spot market. She can also deviate when the spot 
market price is less than the contractual price less the penalty for not complying with the basic 
volume in the contract.  
We have modelled all three deviations in our scenarios. We have not modelled the fourth possible 
scenario in this preliminary paper: when the shipper knows the capacity of the carrier and the carrier 
is not aware of the exact demand received by the shipper. We intend to address this scenario in a 
later extension of this paper. 
 
3.4.  Demand and capacity characteristics 
State of nature is represented using three variables: Ps is the market price for immediate transport. 
The demands that the shippers meet individually and non-competitively are two exogenous, 
stochastic variables ζL ζs. Ω(Ps,QL,Qs) is the probability space containing the possible realizations of 
the triplets of transport spot price, and of demands addressed to shipper SL and the market. FL(.) and 
Fs(.) are the continuously differentiable, invertible and monotonous cumulative distribution function 
of demand addressed to, respectively, SL and the market. fL(.) and fs(.) are the density functions of 
FL(.) and Fs(.). Fp(.) is the continuously differentiable, invertible and monotonous cumulative 
distribution function of the spot market price Ps and fp(.) its density function (mean µp and standard 
deviation σp. Let f(.) be the density function of the joint continuously differentiable, invertible and 
monotonous cumulative distribution function F(.) of both QL and Ps.  Let  [ ] 1,1 D ρ ∈−  be the   XAVIER BRUSSET  12 
 
 
correlation factor between FL(.) and Fs(.) and let  [ ] 1,1 p ρ ∈−  be the correlation factor between FL(.) 
and Fp(.). Often,   and  0 Dp ρρ ≥  reflect the fact that the carriers have specialized transport capacity 
and serve one single industrial sector, leading to spot market prices rising in accordance with 
realized demands addressed to the shippers because of tightening capacity all around. This causes 
stronger constraints on the capacity of the carrier as well as higher variance of transport costs to the 
shippers. Each shipper knows ex-ante the mean µ and standard deviation σ (µL, σL for SL and µs, σs 
for demand originating from spot market) of the cumulative distribution function of their demand. 
The demands have to be satisfied in full at each period; meaning that there is no backlogging: any 
unsatisfied demand is lost. 
All other production costs of SL are ignored. 
The total capacity of C is W. C has a variable cost per unit transported Vc and a fixed cost Fc. No 
assumption is made regarding W. Fc is a function of this capacity W.  
 
Fig. 2: Capacity allocation  
In figure 1, u is the demand that SL chooses to allocate to C, xL is the capacity that C chooses to 
allocate to SL, xs is the capacity allocated to the spot market by C. It is apparent that the allocation 
of capacity of C to SL is dependant upon the demand that SL allocates to C in the first place. 
 
 
3.5.  Objective functions 
3.5.1.  Regionalizing the probability space 
We divide the probability space Ω into regions which facilitates the discussion as to the best 
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Fig. 3: Probability spaces for spot price and demand addressed to SL 
 
3.5.2.  Carrier objective function 
In our setting, carrier C has just two customers: SL and the spot market (fig. 1). We could have 
included in our model the possibility by the carrier to sell all his excess capacity on the spot market. 
We felt, however, that this would have been a too great departure from real practice as the lead time 
to be able to sell all excess capacity depends upon the knowledge of all market demand. This 
knowledge requires the assumption that the carrier C has an extensive commercial network or that 
information gathering is costless. As the experience of the freight matching exchanges show, this is 
not standard. So we have assumed that this knowledge is not given. If the summed demands from 
these two do not reach total capacity, the excess capacity is lost for all intents and purposes: carrier 
C cannot sell all his excess capacity. This is not a peculiar quirk of our model but the reflection of 
true market reality. This unused capacity impacts the carrier’s profitability and ability to support the 
long-term investments that he must incur to face the demands at least from SL. We have not 
included it as a separate objective to carrier C as all components are already present in the above 
objective function. 
The objective function of the carrier is to increase revenue and reduce standard deviation of 
revenues over all periods. His best efforts should therefore be to focus the search of long term 
clients and assure constant volume of business so as to mitigate the risk he assumes by investing in 
new capacity. To that end, signing a contract with a shipper that guarantees periodic volumes at 
fixed prices covering both fixed and variable cost is the best strategy. His decision variables are the 
capacity he allots to each source of demand: xL is the allotted capacity to SL and xs to the spot 
market.  Ls Wx x −−is the wasted capacity. We consider that the fixed costs of supporting the 
necessary assets are specific, sunk and that the carrier does not have the choice to withdraw from 
the allocation game with SL. We therefore neglect all considerations as to fixed costs of C. His 
profit function can thus be written by using the terms of the contract. 






















The profit function is conditional upon the allocation by SL and the spot market price: 
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Where  () , Ls VC x x is the variable cost as a function of the allocation of capacity to SL and the 
market and where Ri is a revenue function, conditional upon the demand u addressed by SL and the 
spot market price, of the form: 
()
( ) () ( )
()
() ()
min ,       :0
|,     :
      :
LL L c L s L L
iL L L LL a L L L L a
L LL L a LLL a s LL aL
x cu q xq u x q
Rx u i q c x q p q x q q
qc x q p x q q P q q x W
θθ  −− + − ≤ <
  Ω= + − ≤ ≤ + 
 +− +− − +< ≤  
   (2) 
qL, qLa, c, pLa and θc ,θs are the parameters defined by the contract. Ps is the spot market price (fig.4). 
   
Fig 4: Behaviour of  f(xL)where u=W 
The overall profit depends on the allocation of capacity between the demands received from SL and 
from the market, but also on the spot price as the optimal allocation of capacity by C to SL will vary 
according to how much revenue can be had by diverting that same capacity to the spot market. By 
investigation, we see also that SL has an opportunity to reduce transport cost by diverting cargo to 
the spot market when conditions of the spot price relative to the contract parameters warrant it. 
3.5.3.  Shipper objective function 
Shipper SL faces the following situation: she produces and sells a product that requires 
transportation, either in the internal supply chain process or in the relationship with his clients. For 
obvious budgetary reasons, she has to ensure that transport costs remain as constant and predictable 
as possible. To ensure that budget cost constraints are met and cost variance remains low, her best 
option is to negotiate beforehand a contract with a duly selected carrier whereby the average 
predicted level of demand that she has budgeted can be transported for a known and defined price. 
When that contract is in place, she must decide whether to allocate her necessity to her chosen 
contractual carrier at the ex-ante contractual price or to the spot market at the going spot market 
price. She plays the role of the Stackelberg leader in this game. 
The decision variable u can take all values between 0 and total received demand QL. This necessity 
can be distributed among the different probability spaces described below according to both Ps and 
QL (see fig. 5). Whatever transport necessity is not being allocated to C will be offered to the spot 
market at the going spot price Ps. The function is conditional upon the response SL receives from C 
which is represented by xL(u). 
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Fig.5: Behaviour of C(u) 
 
3.5.4.  Defining optimal decisions according to demand and spot price 
In each region of probability space, the optimal decisions by each player are different. Let us 
discuss how the carrier C can optimize his revenue according to spot and demand. By symmetry, 
the same optimal decision by SL will minimize the cost for her, so the revenue function is 
symmetrically reflected in the cost function for each region of probability space. Let us call RΩ and 
CΩ the revenue and cost functions over each separate domain identified by its number. 
 
o  Case 1: Ω1 
Realized demand received by SL is less than contracted, whatever the spot price, the 
shipper and carrier honour the contract. Because the minimum capacity included in the 
contract is higher, SL pays a penalty in proportion to the unused capacity. Neither have 
any liberty of choice in this space. C has no choice but to allocate xL = u capacity to SL 
as otherwise, he runs the risk of having the contract reopened, a risk he does not want 
to run as we have seen above (Cf. 3.2.2 Decision rights).  
The equation for this small segment of realized demand and spot price can be written 
as: 
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By symmetry, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1, |1 LL L s Cu x u cqx u θ Ω Ω= + −      (5) 
This gives the optimal allocation for SL:
*
1 L uQ =  











11 |, 1 LL L L s Cux Q cqQ θ Ω Ω= + −     (6) 
which minimizes the penalty to be paid to C. Giving in turn:
*
1 LL x Q =  
( ) ()
**
11 1 ,| 1 LL L L s Rxu Q cqQ θ Ω Ω= + −     (7) 
o  Case 2: Ω2 
Realized demand addressed to SL is between qL and qLa. Here, each has the possibility 
to choose how to allocate capacity above the minimum contractual obligations. SL can 
choose to allocate all demand in excess of qL either to the spot market, to C but at spot 
price or to C using the menu of prices included in the contract. C also can choose to 
refuse the extra capacity. The optimal behaviour here is for SL to call on C for extra 
capacity but at the spot price, since the spot price is lower than the menu price pLa less 
the penalty for not using carrier C’s capacity, and pays to C the penalty θs as built into 
the contract. This reduces SL’s transport cost. 
The equation for this segment of realized demand and price is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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The optimal allocation for each is achieved when 
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22 LL uq x == and gives: 
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    (8) 
o  Case 3: Ω3 
Here demand addressed to SL is still between qL and qLa but the spot price is between 
pLa - θs and pLa + θc. The optimal allocation, is for SL to use the additional capacity qLa 
at the additional price pLa. The optimal behaviour for is to C provide the necessary 
capacity. Transport is performed. No penalties are due. 
The equation is thus: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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The optimal is 
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    (9) 
o  Case 4: Ω4 
Realized demand comes in between qL and qLa but the spot price is over pLa + θc. In 
this case, the carrier will pay SL a penalty for refusing to carry the additional cargo as 
per the QF clause. Cargo will still be carried by C but at the spot price: Ps, giving an 
additional profit to C. 
The revenue equation can still be written as in case 3: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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But the optimal choice becomes 
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    ( 1 0 )  
o  Case 5: Ω5 
In this case, the realized demand exceeds qL + qLa but the spot is lower than the menu 
of prices less the shipper penalty.  The excess over qL + qLa is transported at the spot 
price, whatever its level. The shipper can lower her cost by allocating capacity 
between qL and qL+qLa,  The shipper will allocate the minimum possible to C and have 
the difference transported at Ps and pay the necessary penalty to C. For comparison 
purposes (within scenarios in the next stage), we have supposed that after refusing to 
allocate cargo within the contract, SL still gives the difference of QL – qL to C at the 
spot price. So the revenue still accrues to C. We have: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) () () ()
() () () ( ) ()
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So that the optimal allocation is the same as in Case2 
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o  Case 6: Ω6 
We have the same functions as in case 3 and the optimal is:
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o  Case 7: Ω7 
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77 , LL L uQ x q = =  
The function of this optimal allocation is: 
() ()
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() ()
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o  Case 8: Ω8 
In the following three regions of probability space, the overall capacity of C becomes 
a constraint which limits the revenue to C. C cannot satisfy all SL’s transport capacity. 
There is no such limit on the cost to SL since we have supposed that the spot market 
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L L La La L La s
L L La La L L La s
Rxu q c q p W qqP
Cu x q c q p QqqP
Ω
Ω
Ω= + + − −
Ω= + + − −
 
o  Case 10: Ω10 
() ()
**
10 10 10 ,| 1 0 LL L a c L s Rxu q c q W q P θ Ω Ω= + +−  
() ()
**
10 10 10 ,| 1 0 LL L a c L L s Cxu q c q Q q P θ Ω Ω= + + −  
 
The following table recapitulates the results synthetically: 
Ωi ui
* x Li
* R Ωi C Ωi 
Ω1 QL Q L  ( ) LL L s Qc q Q θ +−   ( ) LL L s Qc q Q θ +−  
Ω2 qL q L  ( )( ) LL L s s qc Q q P θ +− +   ( )() LL L s s qc Q q P θ +− +  
Ω3 QL Q L  ( ) LL L L a qc Q q p +−   ( ) LL L L a qc Q q p +−  
Ω4 QL q L  ( )( ) LL L s c qc Q q P θ +− −   ( )() LL L s c qc Q q P θ +− −  
Ω5 qL q L  ( ) LL a s L L L a s qc q Q q q P θ ++ − −   () LL a s L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω6 QL Q L  ( ) LL a L a L L L a s qc q p Q q q P ++ − −  () LL a L a L L L a s qc q p Q q q P ++ − − 
Ω7 QL q L  ( ) LL a c L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ −  () LL a c L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω8 qL q L  ( ) LL a s L L a s qc q W q q P θ ++ − −   () LL a s L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω9 QL Q L  ( ) LL a L a L L a s qc q p W q q P ++ − −  () LL a L a L L L a s qc q p Q q q P ++ − − 
Ω10 QL q L  ( ) LL a c L s qc q W q P θ ++ −  () LL a c L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Table 1: Expressions of optimal allocation of demand and capacity among different regions of 
probability space 
 
3.5.5.  Redefining optimal decisions by C to include allocations of capacity to market 
So far, we have dealt with the optimal allocation of demand coming from the contractual shipper 
SL. C also has to contend with demand coming from the market at spot prices. This second demand 
upon his capacity comes second by priority and in time. The discussion of the optimal allocation is 
guided by the level of the spot price Ps versus the variable cost of C: VC.  
We now have to adjust the response to the demand from the market to take into account the limit in 
capacity W.  
So the profit function of C that has to be maximised depends upon the regions of probability space 
and can be written:   XAVIER BRUSSET  19 
 
 











 ≤ ≤ 
 ≤≤   
The decision regarding the demand received from the spot market Qs depends upon the value of the 
spot price: if  s PV C <  then, C has no interest in allotting any capacity and  0 s x = . So when 
s PV C <  then the profit function is written as follows: 
() ( ) ,| ,, | , iL s s iL i L x xu Q i Rx u i x V C π Ω= Ω−  
The equations of the optimal allocation according to the regions of probability space reflect exactly 
the results established in 3.5.4. 
We now consider the case when  s PV C > . 
We must once again optimize according to the variables xL and xs in each region of probability 
space: 
o  Case 1: Ω1 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ,| ,, 1 m i n , Ls s L L L s L s s L s x xu Q xu c q xu WxuxPV C xu x πθ Ω= + − + − − +
We first optimize in xL because this is the first decision to be taken by C: 
() () () ( )
**
**
1 ,|,, 1 m i n ,
LL
Ls s L L L s L s s L s
xu Q
x xuQ Q c q Q WQxPV C Q x πθ
==
Ω= + − + − − +
 
The optimization in xs comes immediately: 
() () () ( )
*
***
1 ,| , , 1 m i n ,
ss
L s s L LL s L s s Ls
xQ
x xu Q Q cqQ W Q Q PV C QQ πθ
=
Ω= + − + − − +
 
 
Much as in 3.5.4, we can write the other profit functions in the distinct regions of probability space. 





* πΩi C Ωi 
Ω1 QL Q L  ()( ) ( ) +min , LL L s L s s L s Qc q Q W Q Q P V CQ Q θ +− − − +  () LL L s Qc q Q θ +−  
Ω2 qL q L  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) +min , LL L s s L s s L s qc Q q P W Q Q P V CQ Q θ +− + − − +  () () LL L s s qc Q q P θ +− +  
Ω3 QL Q L  () ( ) ( ) +min , LL L L a L s s L s qc Q q p W Q Q P V CQ Q +− − − +  () LL L L a qc Q q p +−  
Ω4 QL q L  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) +min , LL L s c L s s L s qc Q q P W Q Q P V CQ Q θ +− − − − +  () () LL L s c qc Q q P θ +− −  
Ω5 qL q L  ( ) ( ) ( ) +min , L L a s LLL a L s s L s qc q Q q q W Q Q yP V CQ Q θ ++ − − − − +   () LL a s L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω6 QL Q L  ( ) ( ) ( ) +min , L L a L a LLL a L ss L s qc q p Q q q W Q Q P V CQ Q ++ − − − −+   () LL a L aL L L a s qc q p Q q q P ++ − − 
Ω7 QL q L  ( ) ( ) ( ) +min , LL a c L L L s s L s qc q Q q W Q Q P V CQ Q θ ++ − − − +   () LL a c L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω8 qL q L  ( ) () ( ) +min , LL a s L L a L s s L s qc q W q q W Q Q P V CQ Q θ ++ − − − − +   () LL a s L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
Ω9 QL Q L  ( ) ( ) ( ) +min , LL a L a L L a L s s L s qc q p W q q W Q Q P V CQ Q ++ − − − −+   ( ) L L a L a LLL a s qc q p Q q q P ++ − − 
Ω10 QL q L  ( ) ( ) ( ) +min , LL a c L L s s L s qc q W q W Q Q P V CQ Q θ ++ − − − +   () LL a c L L s qc q Q q P θ ++ − 
 
 
3.5.6.  Expected cost and variance of transport cost 
Given that we now have defined the costs to the shipper over all regions of the probability space, 
we can define her conditional expected cost as a function of the received demand QL and Ps. 
() ( ) () ()
** **
00
,| , ,, , , L Ls L Ls Ls Ls E C ux QP C ux QPfQPd Q d P
∞∞
=∫∫  
When we open up this equation among the different regions we now have:   XAVIER BRUSSET  21 
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() () () ()
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+






The variance of such conditional expected cost can be calculated when the conditional compound 
probability mass function of the spot price and demand addressed to SL can be inferred from field 
observations. 
4.  INFORMATION SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
 
We can now start modelling how each actor behaves according to the information he holds privately 
or that is common to both and see analytically the impact on the objective functions of C and SL. 
Figure 5 describes the chain of events in time. 
Each scenario is based on a different information assumption, as described above. In the first 
scenario, the information about the realized demands for the shippers is common knowledge to both 
shipper and the carrier, so is the spot market price for carrying that particular cargo at that particular 
period. In the second scenario, the capacity of C is unknown to SL. In the third scenario, C’s 
capacity is unknown to SL and SL’s demand is unknown to C. As mentioned earlier, a fourth 
scenario where the carrier’s capacity is known to SL but SL’s demand is not known to the carrier 
will be studied in a future extension of this paper. 
We put a superscript index for each scenario on the carrier profit, shipper cost and standard 
deviation functions (
11 1 1 ;;; C CR πσ   for scenario 1 for example). 
 
4.1.  Scenario 1: Perfect information:  
In this benchmark scenario, the carrier and shipper share information truthfully, as if coordinated by 
a single centralized organization. We assume common knowledge of: W, total capacity of C; θc, 
penalty incurred by C for not performing contractual service to SL; θs, penalty incurred by SL for not 
calling on the contracted services of C; QL and Qs, the realized demands received by SL and the spot 
market respectively; and of course the spot price Ps. This scenario generates the maximum total 
profit. We consider it as the “benchmark” efficiency scenario against which we measure the 
differences induced by asymmetrical information and strategic action. 
According to the observed demands and spot price, shipper SL decides to allocate the maximum of 
the realized demand to C and C allocates the maximum of his capacity to satisfy SL.  
( ) ,m i n , LL L uQ x W Q ==      ( 1 5 )  
So, their situation can be resumed below:   XAVIER BRUSSET  22 
 
 
  1 L Q ∈Ω : realized demand is less than contracted capacity. C offers remaining capacity 
to the market according to revealed demand Qs. Any capacity of C left over is lost. C 




1 |, 1 LL L L s Cux Q cqQ θ Ω Ω= + −  
( ) ( )
11 * 1 *
1 ,| 1 LL L L s Rxu Q cqQ θ Ω Ω= + −  
  234 L Q ∈Ω ∪Ω ∪Ω : realized demand is more than contracted capacity but still within 
range of menu of prices included in the contract. Shipper buys additional capacity to C at the 
corresponding price in the contract menu. For this part of the demand received, SL forfeits 
using the spot market, so no account is taken of the level of the spot versus pLa and the 
penalties. The excess capacity of C is offered to the market in accordance with market 
realized demand. Any remaining capacity of C is lost. Transport is performed and paid for. 
No penalties are due. The revenue and cost equations for SL and C are the same as (9) in 
Case 3 above: 
( ) ()
() ()
11 * 1 *
234




LL L L L a
LL L L L a
Rx u q c Q q p
Cu x q c Q q p
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω = + −
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω = + −
 
  567 L Q ∈Ω ∪Ω ∪Ω : realized demand exceeds not only contracted capacity but also 
the extra capacity of the menu of prices included in the ex-ante contract. Shipper SL must 
complement the committed capacity of C by buying from C extra capacity at the going spot 
market price of that period. If QL>W than SL can still buy any remaining necessity from the 
spot market as we have considered that it has an unlimited capacity. Remaining capacity is 
offered to the market in the limit of Qs and W-QL. Payout occurs. The revenue and cost 
equations for SL and C are the same as (12) in Case 6 above: 
( ) () ( )
() ()
11 * 1 *
567
11 * 1 *
567
,| 5 6 7 m i n,
,| 567
L L La La L L s
L L L a L a LLL a s
Rx u q c q p W Q q P
Cu x q c q p Q q q P
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω = + + −
Ω∪ Ω∪ Ω = + + − −
 
 
The optimized revenue function R for C varies according to the different values of Ps and the 
sharing of capacity between SL and the market: 
() ()
() () ( )
() () ( )
() ( ) () ()
11 * 1 *
min , , , 1
,, , , , m i n , , , 234
min , , , 5 6 7
LL L s L s sL s
cL s Lss L s L L LL a L ss Ls
L L a L a LLL a L ss L s
Qc q Q W Q x P Q P
xxQ Q PV C x x q cQq p W Q x PQ P
qc q p Q q q W Q x P Q P
θ
π
 +− + − ∀ ∈ Ω   −=+ − + − ∀ ∈ Ω ∪ Ω ∪ Ω 
 + + − − + − ∀ ∈Ω ∪Ω ∪Ω  
 (16) 
The optimized cost function of SL becomes: 
()
( ) ( )
() ()
() ( )
11 * 1 *
,, 1
,, , , , 234
,, 5 6 7
LL L sL s
LL s L L L L a L s
L L a L a LLL a s L s
Qc q Q Q P
Cu x QP q c Q q p QP
qc q p Q q q P Q P
θ  +− ∀ ∈ Ω
 =+ − ∀ ∈ Ω ∪ Ω ∪ Ω 
 + + − − ∀ ∈Ω ∪Ω ∪Ω 
 (17) 
In the present scenario, the objective is to maximise both revenues for the carrier and minimize the 
costs for the shipper, since we can coordinate both at once. In this scenario, the Stackelberg position 
of SL does not influence the outcome since no deviation will occur.  
The conditional expected cost as a function of the received demand QL subject to Ps comes to:   XAVIER BRUSSET  23 
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The conditional variance can here also be calculated. 
 
4.2.  Scenario 2: Asymmetric information: 
In the second scenario, C has private information on W, the transport capacity. When negotiating 
for the contractual capacity in the contract, SL has verified that C has at his disposal sufficient 
capacity to comply with qL. She did not or could not verify the existence or size of the additional 
capacity SL has to invest in to meet the commitments of the menu of prices (possible sub-
contractors to C, extension of capacity in future, changes in other client demand patterns, etc are all 
possible reasons for such lack of observation).  
So C has an opportunity to deviate when Ps is higher than pLa + θc. If C deviates, the demand in 
excess of qL by SL has to be offered to the spot market. So the cost increases for SL. C has been 
modelled to take that same amount from the spot market at the spot price so as to make it easier to 
compare performance and rent transfer between both players in the conclusions. The exact demand 
QL of SL is here assumed observable by both SL and C. In this scenario, the deviation is one-sided 
and limited to the carrier; in the next scenario, we will also take into account deviation on the part 
of the shipper SL. The cost function of SL and the revenue function of C are the following: 
  ( ) ,1 Ls QP∈Ω  
The same pattern as in scenario 1, no change in decisions nor functions: 
( ) ()
22 * 2 *
1 ,, Ls L L L s CxuPQ cqQ θ Ω =+−  
  ( ) ,2 3 Ls QP∈Ω ∪Ω  
Here again the same pattern of behaviour is observed for both actors as in scenario 1 
  ( ) ,4 Ls QP∈Ω  
SL wishes to allocate min(QL,qL+qLa) to C. C refuses and decides to allocate all his capacity 
in excess of qL to the spot market, he pays a penalty to SL. SL turns to the spot market for 
() LL Qq − , and receives the penalty from C. The cost and revenue functions are the same as 
(10) in case 4 above: 
( ) () ()
() () ()
22 * 2 *
4




LL L L s c
LL L L s c
Rxu q c QqP





Ω= + − −
Ω= + − −
 
  ( ) ,5 6 Ls QP∈Ω ∪Ω  
As in scenario 1, both stick to the contract and the equations of cost and revenue are the 
same as in (12) in case 6 above. 






,| 56 m i n ,
,| 56
LL L a L a L L s
LL L a L a L L L a s
Rx u q c q p W Q q P
Cu x q c q p Q q q P
Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω
Ω∪ Ω = + + −
Ω∪ Ω = + + − −
 
  ( ) ,7 Ls QP∈Ω    XAVIER BRUSSET  24 
 
 
 C misbehaves when the spot is above the added menu of prices plus penalty for the portion 
of demand that is equal to qLa. The revenue and cost functions are the same as (13) in case 7. 
() () ( )
() ()
22 * 2 *
7
22 * 2 *
7
,| 7 m i n ,
,| 7
LL L a c L L s
LL L a c L L s
Rxu q c q W Q q P





Ω= + + −
Ω= + + −
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LL a L a L L L a s L s
LL a c L L s L s
Qc q Q Q P
qc Q q p Q P
CuxQP
qc Q q P Q P
qc q p Q q q P Q P






 +− ∀ ∈ Ω

+− ∀ ∈ Ω ∪ Ω  = 
+− −∀ ∈ Ω 
 + +− − ∀ ∈ Ω ∪ Ω 




4.3.  Scenario 3: Private information:  
In this scenario, C has private information on W, SL has private information on the demand QL: so 
both have an option to behave opportunistically according to the spot price Ps. Both carrier and 
shipper monitor whether the counterparty effectively sticks to the letter of the contract, but they 
cannot ensure that each receives the most out of the other. So each sticks to qL, basic capacity 
contracted for. In this last scenario, the menu of prices is unenforceable. In effect, for any spot price 
either higher or lower than the menu price pLa according to the additional capacity necessary, either 
the shipper or the carrier decides to go to the spot market. The other party, for lack of knowledge of 
capacity or cargo, cannot ask for nor receive any compensation. 
  ( ) ,1 Ls QP∈Ω  
No deviation occurs, the functions are the same as in scenario 1. 
  ( ) ,2 Ls QP∈Ω  
SL deviates and prefers to deal at the spot price and declares to C that, as there is no extra 
cargo to be taken, she has no penalty to pay. We have included in the model revenue to C for 
that cargo allocated to the spot market for comparison purposes, but the penalty that SL 
would have paid had C known about that extra cargo is not included in the revenue. The 
revenue and cost functions differ from (8) in case 2 above: 
( ) ()
() ()
33 * 3 *
2




LL L L s
LL L L s
Rxu q c Qq P






  ( ) ,3 Ls QP∈Ω  
The penalties are sufficient to dissuade both shipper and carrier to deviate in this region of 
probability space, so the revenue and cost functions for the optimal allocations are the same 
as in scenario 1. 
  ( ) ,4 Ls QP∈Ω  
The carrier deviates as in scenario 2 and allocates his capacity to the market, to the detriment 
of SL. However, no penalty is paid, hence, the cost and revenue functions change to: 
( ) ()
() ()
33 * 3 *
4




LL L L s
LL L L s
Rxu q c Qq P
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  ( ) ,5 Ls QP∈Ω  
SL reports less demand to C, completes for the rest from the spot market. C has no way to 
check, so does not ask for, nor receive, the corresponding penalty. The cost and revenue 
functions are now written: 
( ) () ( )
() ()
33 * 3 *
5
33 * 3 *
5
,| 5 m i n,
,| 5
LL L L s
LL L L s
Rxu q c W Q q P






  ( ) ,6 Ls QP∈Ω  
As in scenario1, no deviation takes place. We have the same revenue and cost functions. 
  ( ) ,7 Ls QP∈Ω  
As in scenario 2, C refuses to carry any cargo above qL and does not pay any penalty either, 
arguing that he lacks capacity (unobservable by SL): 
( ) () ( )
() ()
33 * 3 *
7
33 * 3 *
7
,| 7 m i n,
,| 7
LL L L s
LL L L s
Rxu q c W Q q P






The cost and revenue functions are the ones previously mentioned but with the extra portion 
of realized demand exceeding contractual obligations that in any case will be allocated to C 
at spot market price. 
The optimal cost function for SL is now reduced to: 
()
( ) ( )
() ()
() () () ( )
() ()
33 * 3 *
,, 1
,, 2 4 5 7
,, ,
min , , , 6
,, 3
LL L s L s
LL L s L s
LL s
LL L L a L a L L L a s L s
LL L L a L s
Qc q Q Q P
qc Q q P Q P
Cu x QP
qc Q q q p Q q q P Q P
qc Q q p Q P
θ  +− ∀ ∈ Ω

+− ∀ ∈ Ω ∪ Ω ∪ Ω ∪ Ω 
=  + −+ − − ∀ ∈ Ω 
 +− ∀ ∈ Ω 
(20) 
 
4.4.  Conclusion 
4.4.1.  Comparison between scenario 1 and 2 
The differences between scenario 1 and scenario 2 can be calculated by using the partitions already 
created (see figure 3): we have a difference only when QL comes in between qL and qL+qLa and the 
spot price is above pLa.+ θc, which belongs to partition Ω4. 
() ,4 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
() ( ) () ()
2 2* 2* 1 1* 1* ,,, ,,, LL sL L s L L s c L a x uQ P x uQ P Q q P p ππ θ −= − − −    (21) 
( ) ( ) () ()
2 2* 2* 1 1* 1* ,, , ,, , LL s LL s L L s c L a Cu x QP Cux QP Q q P p θ −= − − −    (22) 
So we can write: 
() , Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
() ( )
() ( )
2 2* 2* 1 1* 1*
22 * 2 * 11 * 1 *
,,, ,,, 0
,, , ,, , 0
LL sL L s
LL s LL s
x u QP x uQP




Both results are positive if there is but one instance of both the spot price higher than the menu of 
prices fixed in the contract plus the carrier penalty and existence of cargo to be taken in excess of 
base commitment qL. By design of the contract, these situations should arise often unless the 
penalty is “high”, ie, in the case of spot price following a normal distribution, if 
2 La c s s pµ θ σ +=+  than SL will suffer in the 5% of cases when the spot is above its average plus 2   XAVIER BRUSSET  26 
 
 
standard deviations. Moreover this will only be the case when the demand received will also exceed 
the base commitment qL of the contract. However, it remains to be seen whether C will allow θc to 
be that high.  
There is a transfer of resources from SL to C when C can deviate from truthful behaviour by hiding 
the exact capacity he has at his disposal and withhold extra capacity from SL to sell it to the spot 
market at a higher price. 
The conditional expected cost of the difference in information is written: 
( ) ( ) ( ) () () () ()
() ( ) ( )
2 2* 2* 1 1* 1*
44
2 2* 2* 1 1* 1*
,, , ,, , ,
,,, ,,,
sL
LL s LL s L L s L a L sL s
PQ
LL sL L s
E Cu x QP Cu x QP Q q P p fQPd Q d P






The variance of the transport cost to SL increases with the variances of the component laws: ζL and 
Ps affected by the values given to the contractual parameters. 
 
4.4.2.  Comparison between scenario 1 and 3 
The differences occur in regions Ω2,Ω4,Ω5 and Ω7 when either the shipper or the carrier has an 
incentive to deviate. By investigation, these come to: 
() ,2 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
( ) ( ) () ()
3 3* 3* 1 1* 1* ,,, ,,, LL sL L s L L L a s x uQ P x uQ P Q q p P ππ −= − −     ( 2 4 )  
() ( ) () ()
3 3* 3* 1 1* 1* ,,, ,,, LL sL L s L L L a s Cx uQP Cx uQP Q q p P −= − −   (25) 
() ,4 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
( ) ( ) () ()
3* * 1* * ,, , ,, , LL s LL s L L s L a x uQP x uQP Q q P p ππ −= − −     ( 2 6 )  
() ( ) () ()
3 3* 3* 1 1* 1* ,,, ,,, LL sL L s L L s L a Cx uQP Cx uQP Q q P p −= − −   (27) 
() ,5 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
( ) ( ) ()
3* * 1* * ,, , ,, , LL s LL s L a s L a x uQP x uQP q P p ππ −= −      ( 2 8 )  
() ,7 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω  
( ) ( ) ()
3* * 1* * ,, , ,, , LL s LL s L a s L a x uQP x uQP q P p ππ −= −      ( 2 9 )  
() ,1 3 6 Ls QP ∀∈ Ω ∪ Ω ∪ Ω  
() ( )
3* * 1* * ,, , ,, , 0 LL s LL s xu Q P xu Q P ππ −=       ( 3 0 )    
() ( )
3* * 1* * ,, , ,, , 0
L Ls L L s Cxu QP Cxu QP −=       ( 3 1 )    
The conditional expectation of this difference subject to Ps and QL can be written as:   XAVIER BRUSSET  27 
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Following the same reasoning, we can write the conditional expectation of the difference, subject to 
Ps and QL, of the profit to the carrier as: 
() () () () () ( ) ()
() () () ()
() () ()
() () ()
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These indications give guidance to the way the contractual parameters have to be negotiated by the 
shipper and the carrier so that if the information conditions are not given, at least the differences 
between both scenarios can be minimized. Such uncertainties and optimization of the contractual 
parameters will be the subject of another paper. For now, we have found that applying the preceding 
reasoning through a numerical study would give some indications as to the importance of the 
different parameters on behaviour by SL and C. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE EVOLUTION 
There is a lack of research and practice in approaching transport as a full fledged member of a 
supply chain. In this paper, we present transport as an individualized supply chain member and 
supplier to the chain. We have modelled the impact and influence that information sharing and 
coordination with transport suppliers has on the efficiency of the supply chain. The present model 
only studies the influence of three information factors and six coordination factors on the cost, 
standard deviation of such cost of the transport supplier to the supply chain. We have not 
considered agglomerating these three gauges into one sole efficiency index as we believe that this 
would entail a loss of information from the point of view of application to practice. Another 
dimension which we have totally obviated but which singularly influences the behaviour of both 
shipper and carrier, and hence the supply chain efficiency, is the lead time between revelations of 
demand addressed to the shipper and realization of the transport by the carrier. This lead time is 
influenced by whether the shipper receives an immediate response from the carrier or if he has to go 
out and buy transport capacity on the spot market; it is also influenced by the time that the carrier 
has to wait for orders to come in from other shippers before answering to the shipper with which he 
is linked by a contract. 
Given these limitations, however, the conclusions we arrive at are interesting in advancing the 
debate about the influence of information asymmetry and contractual coordination in the supply 
chain for such an important element as transport. 
1.  First, as in Seifert 2003, we confirm that adopting a procurement policy where spot buying 
complements contract buying is a superior policy to the one consisting of pure spot buying. 
In particular, standard deviation of the transport cost in a mixed contract and spot buying 
strategy is half the one in pure spot buying.   XAVIER BRUSSET  28 
 
 
2.  The contract in the mixed strategy must include a fixed capacity commitment and some 
additional flexibility in capacity (QF clause).  
3.  Penalties should be included: the carrier is penalised when he cannot comply with his 
contractual capacity engagements; the shipper is penalised when he cannot fulfil his 
buying engagements. We have shown that this ensures coordination.  
4.  We show that the carrier, even if his revenues are not as high when linked to a shipper by a 
contract, still has ample motivation to elect such a choice as opposed to selling his capacity 
in the spot market. 
5.  The numerical study clearly shows that some contractual arrangements existing ex-ante 
have singular power to iron out information asymmetry between carrier and shipper. 
Overall, contractual arrangements do not dominate the results of central coordination or 
costless information. To reach this level of central coordination, we argue that the best way 
is for both shipper and carrier to trust each other. This truthfulness should enable each 
party to build a trust relationship and his or her reputation in the sense of Williamson 1996 
(“a farsighted approach to contracting (in which credible commitments, or lack thereof, 
play a key role)”). 
6.  We have proved that if the committed contract capacity fixed in the contract is too low 
(less than the estimated average of demand plus one standard deviation) and when the 
contract price is set too low compared to the current average spot price observed, the 
carrier has a strong incentive to behave opportunistically and fail the shipper, causing 
increase in average transport cost and standard deviation of cost. In this case, whatever 
their level, penalties bear only incidental influence. 
7.  The information imbalances induced by keeping private information as to the real transport 
capacity by the carrier, the real demand received by the shipper is detrimental to the 
overall efficiency of the supply chain, when the ex-ante contractual coordination 
mechanism has been poorly designed, because it encourages deviant attitudes both from 
the carrier and the shipper. We have proved that these imbalances are a direct function of 
the contract parameters negotiated. 
8.  Carefully crafted ex-ante contractual arrangements can substantially correct this 
information asymmetry but increases the overall transport cost to the shipper. The most 
influential factors in the contract are the committed capacity, the contract price for this 
committed capacity and, to a lesser degree, the additional capacity with an increasing 
menu of prices offered by the carrier. 
One prolongation of the present paper will deal with solving the mathematical model for the 
optimal contract parameters both in terms of information as well as coordination as expressed in 
terms of cost and standard deviation. Another will deal with multiple carriers and multiple shippers. 
The aim of the supply chain manager should be to reduce standard deviation because added cost 
standard deviation is an incentive, in a multi-period game, to increase margins at both levels of the 
supply chain increasing the notorious double margining phenomenon. The shipper increases his 
budgeted costs because he cannot ensure regularity of his cost and hence must protect himself by 
padding his transport budget; the carrier because he has to contend with fixed cost non-scalable 
capacity and so must also preserve his financial health by higher than warranted profit margins. 
Another avenue to be explored is the study of how standard deviation of transport cost is affected 
by different levels of the variance of both the spot price Ps and the demand QL (along the lines of 
Seifert 2003 or Gavinerni et al 1999). 
It would be interesting to enlarge the study by adding further information variables germane to the 
transport industry: time schedules of the carrier, projections of future demand (entails sharing sales 
forecasts by the shipper), advance knowledge of points of delivery among others. In all cases, the 
most interesting point to study is to allow the carrier to increase capacity utilization and reduce 
revenue volatility and thus share with the supply chain the economies. The net effect to the supply 
chain would be to reduce the total investment cost of the transport capacity contracted and hence the 
total transport cost component. In fact, the logistics industry as a whole is investing and developing 
tools to enhance the circulation of information among the interested parties as has been shown in 
the survey in Peters (2002). All these sets of information demand a much higher of level of trust and 
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